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Harmonised investigation of occurrence of human enteric viruses in the leafy green vegetables supply chain in three European countries

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Corresponding Author:	Petros A. Kokkinos, Ph.D. University of Patras Rion Patras, Achaia GREECE
Corresponding Author Secondary Information:	
Corresponding Author's Institution:	University of Patras
Corresponding Author's Secondary Institution:	
First Author:	Petros A. Kokkinos, Ph.D.
First Author Secondary Information:	
Order of Authors:	Petros A. Kokkinos, Ph.D. Iwona Kozyra Sava Lazic Martijn Bouwknecht Saskia Rutjes Kris Willems Rita Moloney Ana Maria de Roda Husman Agnieszka Kaupke Euaggelia Legaki Martin d'Agostino Nigel Cook Artur Rzezutka Tamas Petrovic Apostolos Vantarakis
Order of Authors Secondary Information:	

*Food and Environmental Virology**Full-length article***Harmonised investigation of occurrence of human enteric viruses in the leafy green vegetables supply chain in three European countries**

P. Kokkinos^{1a} · I. Kozyra^{2a} · S. Lazic^{3a} · M. Bouwknecht⁴ · S. Rutjes⁴ · K. Willems^{5,6} · R. Moloney⁷ · AM. de Roda Husman⁴ · A. Kaupke² · E. Legaki¹ · M. D'Agostino⁸ · N. Cook⁸ · A. Rzeżutka^{2*} · T. Petrovic^{3*} · A. Vantarakis^{1*}

¹*Environmental Microbiology Unit, Laboratory of Hygiene, University of Patras, GR 26500 Rion, Patras, Greece*

²*National Veterinary Research Institute, Pulawy, Poland*

³*Scientific Veterinary Institute "Novi Sad", Serbia*

⁴*National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, RIVM, Netherlands*

⁵*Laboratory for Process Microbial Ecology and Bioinspirational Management, Consortium for Industrial Microbiology and Biotechnology, Department of Microbial and Molecular Systems, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium*

⁶*Scientia Terrae Research Institute, Sint-Katelijne-Waver, Belgium*

⁷*Environmental Health Service, Health Service Executive, Sandfield Centre, Ennis, Co. Clare, Ireland*

⁸*Food and Environment Research Agency (FERA), Sand Hutton, York, United Kingdom*

Running title: virus contamination of leafy greens in Europe

^a These authors contributed equally to the work.

* *Corresponding authors:*

* Apostolos Vantarakis. Environmental Microbiology Unit, Department of Public Health, Medical School, University of Patras, University Campus, 26500 Patras, Greece. Tel./Fax: +30-2610-969875, e-mail: avantar@med.upatras.gr

* Tamas Petrovic. Scientific Veterinary Institute "Novi Sad", Rumenacki put 20, 21000 Novi Sad, Serbia. Tel.: +38121518149 Fax: +38121518544, e-mail: tomy@niv.ns.ac.yu

* Artur Rzeżutka. National Veterinary Research Institute. Al. Partyzantów 57, 24-100 Pulawy, Poland. Tel.: +48 818893037, e-mail: arzez@piwet.pulawy.pl

Abstract

Numerous outbreaks of disease have been attributed to the consumption of raw or minimally processed leafy green vegetables contaminated with enteric viral pathogens. The aim of the present study was an integrated virological monitoring of the salad vegetables supply chain in Europe, from production, processing, and point of sale. Samples were taken at “general” and “ad hoc” sampling points which were perceived as critical points for virus contamination. General points were identified through the analysis of background information questionnaires based on HACCP audit principles, and ad hoc points during food safety fact-finding visits. Samples were collected and analyzed in Greece, Serbia and Poland. Sampling points representing the production and processing phases were harvesters’ hands, toilets, toilet door handles, surface swabs, irrigation and rinsing water. Lettuce heads, representing the point of sale phase, were collected at supermarkets and a farmers’ market. The samples were analysed for a range of viruses, including the significant foodborne agents and viruses which indicate that a contamination route exists from human or animal sources. Human (hAdV) and porcine (pAdV) adenovirus, hepatitis A (HAV) and E (HEV) virus, Norovirus GI and GII (NoV), and bovine Polyomavirus (bPyV) were detected using real-time (RT-) PCR based protocols. General samples were positive for hAdV, pAdV, HAV, HEV, NoV GI, NoV GII, and bPyV, at 20.09% (134/667), 5.53% (13/235), 1.32% (4/304), 3.42% (5/146), 2% (6/299), 2.95% (8/271), and 0.82% (2/245), respectively. Ad hoc samples were positive for hAdV, pAdV, bPyV, and NoV GI, at 9% (3/33), 9% (2/22), 4.54% (1/22), and 7.14% (1/14), respectively. These results demonstrate the existence of viral contamination routes from human and animal sources to the salad vegetable supply chain, and specifically indicated the potential for virus contamination at primary production.

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3 **Keywords:** foodborne virus . virological quality . leafy vegetables . molecular
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detection

7 **Introduction**

10 In recent decades public health promotion of healthier lifestyles has led to increased
11 demand for fresh produce in many industrialized nations. (WHO/FAO 2008) This has
12 led to consumer demand for minimally processed, prepacked, ready-to eat fruit and
13 vegetables and availability of out-of-season produce. (Heaton 2008) The growing
14 burden of the foodborne outbreaks due to viral contamination of fresh produce in
15 many parts of the world reflects a convergence of increasing consumption of fresh
16 produce, changes in production and distribution, and a growing awareness of the
17 problem on the part of public health officials. (Lynch et al. 2009) Vegetables are
18 important components of a healthy and balanced diet, and their consumption is
19 encouraged in many countries by government health agencies. However, vegetables
20 and in particular leafy greens that are consumed raw are increasingly being
21 recognized as vehicles for transmission of human pathogens, including viruses.
22 (FAO/WHO 2008, Croci et al. 2008, Berger et al. 2010). Numerous foodborne virus
23 outbreaks have been linked to the consumption of contaminated fresh produce.
24 (Alexander 1986, Lowry et al. 1989, Rosenblum et al. 1990, Warner et al. 1991,
25 Kilgore et al. 1996, Hernandez et al. 1997, Pebody et al. 1998, Seymour and Appleton
26 2001, Holtby et al. 2001, Nygård et al. 2001, Dentinger et al. 2001, Long et al. 2002,
27 Koopmans and Duizer 2004, Wang and Moran 2004, Wheeler et al. 2005,
28 Widdowson et al. 2005, Baert 2008, Heaton 2008, Warriner 2009, Mesquita 2009,
29 Makary et al. 2009, Berger 2010, Scallan et al. 2011). The lessons from these
30 outbreaks are clear, despite the uncertainties regarding the biology of pathogens on

1 produce. Contamination cannot be washed off, and once contamination occurs there
2 are at present no points during the processing, distribution and service of fresh
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5 produce at which microbiological hazards can be effectively controlled (Lynch et al.
6
7 2009). In the food industry, the major concepts such as HACCP have been directed at
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9 bacterial and fungal pathogens only. Also, analyzing the impact of virus
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11 contamination of food has hitherto been based on gathering epidemiological
12
13 information, which occurs only in response or as a reaction to disease outbreaks, and a
14
15 coordinated and validated system or network does not yet exist to routinely and
16
17 proactively monitor actual food samples. (Rodriguez-Lazaro et al., in press) The
18
19 World Health Organisation identified norovirus and hepatitis A virus in fresh produce
20
21 as a priority virus / commodity combination for which control measures should be
22
23 considered. (FAO/WHO, 2008) Despite the increased importance of fresh produce as
24
25 a vehicle for human pathogens, there is currently limited knowledge about where in
26
27 the supply chain contamination occurs or about the mechanism by which human
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29 pathogens colonize and survive on or in fruits and vegetables. (Berger et al. 2010)
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31 Enteric viruses can be introduced into the food supply chain during different stages of
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33 food production. There is no strict evidence which stage of the production process is
34
35 the most vulnerable for virus contamination. However, in the majority of
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37 contamination events produce becomes contaminated on the farm during growing or
38
39 harvesting. Routes of contamination are varied and include application of organic
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41 wastes to agricultural land as fertilizer, contamination of waters used for irrigation
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43 with faecal material, direct contamination by livestock, wild animals and birds and
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45 postharvest issues such as worker hygiene. (Heaton and Jones 2007)
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48 The European FP7 project VITAL (Integrated Monitoring and Control of Foodborne
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50 Viruses in European Food Supply Chains) (<http://www.eurovital.org/>) aimed to gather
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1 data on virus contamination with the aim of providing a basis for subsequent
2 quantitative viral risk assessment and recommendation of control measures. This
3 paper reports the data obtained from the salad vegetables chain in Europe.
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10 11 **Materials and Methods**

12 **Sampling strategy**

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14 To be able to estimate the infection risk for humans through consumption of the leafy
15 vegetables by using quantitative viral risk assessment (QVRA), the levels of enteric
16 virus contamination at several points in the food supply chain were determined.
17
18 Critical points for virus contamination were identified based on virological expertise,
19 and food safety fact-finding missions at production farms, processing plants and point
20 of sale premises in Greece, Serbia and Poland. These points had been identified
21 briefly as follows. Background information questionnaires, based on HACCP audit
22 principles (K. Willems and R. Moloney; pers. comm.), were completed for each
23 premises. Subsequently the completed questionnaires were analysed by food safety
24 management and risk assessment experts within VITAL, to identify the critical points
25 in the premises where samples would be taken. These points were termed “general”
26 sampling points. Food safety fact-finding visits were made to the premises during
27 which, through direct observations of conditions and practices, more points were
28 identified where contamination with viruses could potentially occur. These were
29 termed “ad hoc” sampling points. The outcome of the QVRA depends on data input,
30 and therefore on the accuracy and certainty of the estimated virus concentrations. The
31 current sampling plan was developed to optimally benefit from a fixed number of
32 samples. The strategy included increasing the probability of detecting virus at a
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1 sampling point when low virus concentrations were expected or aiming for most
2 accurate estimates of *e.g.* prevalence given the total number of samples.
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6 **Sampling locations and sample types**

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9 The sampling was longitudinal and samples from production, processing and point of
10 sale phases were collected. Food businesses in the production and processing phase
11 were mainly small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Only large enterprises, *i.e.*
12 supermarkets, were sampled with the exception of one municipal outdoor market.
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14 Samples representing the production phase were comprised of swabs from harvesters'
15 hands, seasonal workers' hands, toilets/latrines, and toilet doorhandles, irrigation
16 water, and manure. Samples representing the processing phase comprised of swabs
17 from food handlers' hands, knives (manual or mechanical), conveyor belt, and rinsing
18 water. Lettuce heads, representing the point of sale phase, were collected at
19 supermarkets in Greece and Serbia and a farmers' market in Poland. Ad hoc samples
20 comprised of surface swabs (toilets, toilet door handles, plastic crates with and
21 without lettuce heads, lettuce crates supports, internal walls of a truck used for the
22 transportation of lettuce crates, food handlers' hands, knives), a sponge used to clean
23 the bottom of freshly cut lettuce heads, superficial and well irrigation water, and
24 lettuce heads.
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48 **Labelling and transport of samples**

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50 All samples taken were labelled accordingly, including, at least the following details:
51 Analyst, date of sampling, location and reference number to ensure traceability. All
52 samples were placed under refrigeration where possible (*e.g.* using a cool box) and
53 taken to the laboratory as soon as possible for the next analytical steps.
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Sample process control virus

The sample process control virus was murine norovirus 1 (MNV-1), which had been propagated in RAW264.7 cells to a concentration of 10^8 pfu/ml. MNV-1 stocks were kindly provided by the group of Dr. Franco Ruggeri at the Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome, Italy, by agreement with Washington University, USA).

Treatment of lettuce

A representative sample of the lettuce was collected into a sterile plastic bag or other appropriate container and transported to the laboratory. The sample was processed using the method of Dubois et al. (2006). Approximately 25 g of sample was placed in a sterile beaker. 10 μ l of the sample process control virus was pipetted onto the sample. 40 ml of Tris Glycine pH 9.5 buffer containing 1% Beef Extract (TGBE) was added to the sample. The sample was then agitated at room temperature for 20 min by rocking at 60 rpm. The liquid was decanted from the beaker through a strainer (e.g. a tea strainer) into one 50ml or two smaller centrifuge tubes, and centrifuged at 10,000 \times g for 30 min at 4°C. The supernatant(s) was decanted into a single clean tube or bottle, and the pH adjusted to 7.2. 0.25 volumes of 50% (w/v) polyethylene glycol (PEG) 8000/ 1.5 M NaCl were then added, and mixed by inversion. The suspension was then incubated with gentle rocking at 4°C for 60 min, before centrifugation at 10,000 \times g for 30 min at 4°C. The supernatant was discarded, and the pellet compacted by centrifugation at 10,000 \times g for 5 min at 4°C before resuspension in 500 μ l PBS. The suspension was then transferred to a chloroform-resistant tube, and 500 μ l chloroform:butanol (1:1) added and mixed by vortexing. The sample was allowed to stand for 5 min, and then centrifuged at 10,000 \times g for 15 min at 4°C. The aqueous phase was transferred to a clean tube and immediately used for nucleic acid

1 extraction or stored at -20°C . Nucleic acids were extracted using a NucliSENS®
2 miniMAG® kit (bioMérieux) according to the manufacturer's instructions. The final
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5 elutions were performed with 150 μl elution buffer, resulting in a 300 μl nucleic acid
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7 extract. The nucleic acid extract was assayed immediately or stored at -70°C .
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10 11 12 13 14 **Treatment of faeces and animal-derived fertiliser**

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16 A representative sample of faeces or animal-derived fertiliser (at least 1 g) was
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18 collected aseptically by sterile spatula into a sterile plastic bag or tube, and then
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20 transported to the laboratory. 250 mg of the sample was transferred to a 15 ml
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22 centrifuge tube. 2.25 ml of 10 mg ml^{-1} gentamycin-containing PBS solution and 10 μl
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24 of the positive process control virus were added to the sample, which was then mixed
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26 using a vortex mixer at full speed for 1 - 1.5 minutes. Subsequently, the suspension
27
28 was centrifuged at $3000 \times g$ for 15 min, and the supernatant transferred into a clean
29
30 microcentrifuge tube. The supernatant was then immediately used for nucleic acid
31
32 extraction (see below) or stored at -20°C . Nucleic acids were extracted using an
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34 RNeasy Midi kit (QIAGEN) according to the manufacturer's instructions. With
35
36 samples from the soft fruit and salad vegetables supply chains, the final elutions were
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38 performed with 150 μl elution buffer, resulting in a 300 μl nucleic acid extract. The
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40 nucleic acid extract was assayed immediately or stored at -70°C .
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51 **Treatment of handlers' hands**

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53 Handlers' hands were sampled using a 10 cm x 10 cm sterile gauze swab, moistened
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55 in 20 ml of 10 mg ml^{-1} gentamycin-containing PBS solution, contained in a sterile
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57 plastic bag. Sampling was performed at a pre-determined time of day, e.g.
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1 immediately before lunch or afternoon coffee break. The workers selected for
2 sampling were not allowed to wash hands before sampling. After opening the sterile
3 plastic bag and removing excess buffer by squeezing the gauze swab while keeping it
4 in the bag, one of the hands of the handler (the right hand, or left hand if left-handed)
5 was sampled by the swab using a firm pressure rub four or five times on the back, the
6 palm and the spaces between the fingers and all the fingertips. Subsequently, the
7 gauze swab was returned to the plastic bag and transported to the laboratory. The
8 gauze was squeezed in the bag to release the contents, and then discarded into an
9 appropriate receptacle. The liquid in the bag was decanted by pouring into a clean 50
10 ml centrifuge tube. Then 10 μ l of the sample process control virus was added, and the
11 tube vortexed at full speed for 20 seconds. Finally, the suspension was centrifuged at
12 3,000 \times g for 5 minutes and the supernatant transferred into a clean 50 ml centrifuge
13 tube. The supernatant was immediately used for nucleic acid extraction or stored at –
14 20 °C. Nucleic acids were extracted using a NucliSENS® miniMAG® kit
15 (bioMérieux) according to the manufacturer's instructions. With samples from the soft
16 fruit and salad vegetables supply chains, the final elutions were performed with 150 μ l
17 elution buffer, resulting in a 300 μ l nucleic acid extract. With samples from the pork
18 supply chain, the final elutions were performed with 50 μ l elution buffer, resulting in
19 a 100 μ l nucleic acid extract. The nucleic acid extract was assayed immediately or
20 stored at -70 °C.

51 **Treatment of irrigation and food-processing waters**

52 Ten liters of sample was collected into an aseptic container, then transported to the
53 laboratory. There 10 μ l of the sample process control virus was added, and the sample
54 conditioned to pH 3.5 with 1 M or 0.1M HCl. Then the sample was processed by the
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1 method of Vilaginès et al. (1993), as modified by Wyn-Jones et al. (2011). A glass
2 wool filter was made by compressing 10 g glass wool (type 725; Rantigny, Saint-
3 Gobain, France) into a 30 cm by 3 cm polystyrene column to obtain a filter height of
4 6-8 cm. The filter was washed by gravity with 50 ml volumes of (in order) 1 M HCl,
5 tap water, and 1 M NaOH, followed by tap water until the filtrate pH was neutral.
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7 The sample was then passed through the filter at a rate not exceeding 1.5 l min⁻¹.
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9 When all the sample had passed through the filter, viruses were eluted from the glass
10 wool by slow (20-30 min) passage of 200 ml 3% (w/v) beef extract at pH 9.5 in 0.05
11 M glycine buffer through the filter. The eluate was flocculated by the addition of 1 M
12 and 0.1 M HCl until the pH reaches 3.5. The resultant protein floc, containing virus,
13 was deposited by centrifugation at 7,500 x g for 30min, then dissolved in PBS,
14 adjusting to a final volume of 10 ml. This suspension was then filtered through a 0.45
15 µm filter (Sartorius Minisart) to remove remaining particulates. The filter had been
16 pre-treated to prevent viruses from attaching, by passing 5 ml-10 ml 1.5% w/v beef
17 extract at pH 7.4 through it. The filtered suspension was stored at -20°C prior to
18 nucleic acid analysis. Nucleic acids were extracted using a NucliSENS® miniMAG®
19 kit (bioMérieux) according to the manufacturer's instructions. With samples from the
20 soft fruit and salad vegetables supply chains, the final elutions were performed with
21 150 µl elution buffer, resulting in a 300 µl nucleic acid extract. The nucleic acid
22 extract was assayed immediately or stored at -70 °C.
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51 **Hepatitis A virus RT-qPCR**

52 This assay was a one-step duplex RT-qPCR using the primers and conditions
53 described by Costafreda et al. (2006), with the inclusion of an internal amplification
54 control (IAC). The reaction contained 1 X RNA Ultrasense reaction mix (Applied),
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1 0.5 μ M primer HAV68, 0.9 μ M primer HAV240, 0.25 μ M probe HAV150(-)
2 (labelled with FAM), 50 nM IAC probe (labelled with VIC), 1 X ROX reference dye
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4 (Invitrogen), 1 μ l RNA Ultrasense enzyme mix (Invitrogen) and 300 copies of HAV
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6 IAC. Ten μ l sample of nucleic acid extract was added, to make a final reaction
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8 volume of 20 μ l. The thermocycling conditions were 15 min at 50 $^{\circ}$ C, 2 min at 95 $^{\circ}$ C,
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10 followed by 45 cycles of 15 s at 95 $^{\circ}$ C and 1 min at 60 $^{\circ}$ C.
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17 **Hepatitis E virus RT-qPCR**

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19 This assay was a one-step duplex RT-qPCR using the primers and conditions
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21 described by Jothikumar et al. (2006), with the inclusion of an internal amplification
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23 control (IAC). The reaction contained 1 X RNA Ultrasense reaction mix (Applied),
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25 0.25 μ M each primer, 0.1 μ M probe HEV-P (labelled with FAM), 50 nM IAC probe
26
27 (labelled with VIC), 1 X ROX reference dye (Invitrogen), 1 μ l RNA Ultrasense
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29 enzyme mix (Invitrogen) and 300 copies of HEV IAC. Ten μ l sample of nucleic acid
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31 extract was added, to make a final reaction volume of 20 μ l. The thermocycling
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33 conditions were 15 min at 50 $^{\circ}$ C, 2 min at 95 $^{\circ}$ C, followed by 45 cycles of 15 s at 95 $^{\circ}$ C
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35 and 1 min at 60 $^{\circ}$ C.
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44 **Norovirus GI RT-qPCR**

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46 This assay was a one-step duplex RT-qPCR using the primers and conditions
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48 described by Svraka et al. (2007), with the inclusion of an internal amplification
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50 control (IAC). The reaction contained 1 X RNA Ultrasense reaction mix (Applied),
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52 0.5 μ M primer QNIF4, 0.9 μ M primer NV1LCR , 0.25 μ M probe NVGG1p (labelled
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54 with FAM), 50 nM IAC probe (labelled with VIC), 1 X ROX reference dye
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56 (Invitrogen), 1 μ l RNA Ultrasense enzyme mix (Invitrogen) and 300 copies of NoV
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GI IAC. Ten μl sample of nucleic acid extract was added, to make a final reaction volume of 20 μl . The thermocycling conditions were 15 min at 50 °C, 2 min at 95°C, followed by 45 cycles of 15 s at 95°C and 1 min at 60°C.

Norovirus GII RT-qPCR

This assay was a one-step duplex RT-qPCR using the primers and conditions described by da Silva et al. (2007), with the inclusion of an internal amplification control (IAC). The reaction contained 1 X RNA Ultrasense reaction mix (Applied), 0.5 μM primer QNIF2, 0.9 μM primer COG2R, 0.25 μM probe QNIFS (labelled with FAM), 50 nM IAC probe (labelled with VIC), 1 X ROX reference dye (Invitrogen), 1 μl RNA Ultrasense enzyme mix (Invitrogen) and 300 copies of NoV GII IAC. Ten μl sample of nucleic acid extract was added, to make a final reaction volume of 20 μl . The thermocycling conditions were 15 min at 50 °C, 2 min at 95°C, followed by 45 cycles of 15 s at 95°C and 1 min at 60°C.

Human adenovirus qPCR

This assay was a duplex qPCR using the primers and conditions described by Hernroth et al. (2002), with the inclusion of an internal amplification control (IAC) and a carryover contamination prevention system utilising uracil N-glycosylase (UNG). The reaction contained 1 X TaqMan Universal PCR Master Mix (Applied Biosystems), 0.9 μM each primer, 0.225 μM adenovirus TaqMan probe (labelled with FAM), 50 nM IAC probe (labelled with VIC), and 100 copies of adenovirus IAC. Ten μl sample of nucleic acid extract was added, to make a final reaction volume of 25 μl . The thermocycling conditions were 10 min at 95°C, followed by 45 cycles of 15 s at 95°C and 1 min at 60°C.

Porcine adenovirus qPCR

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2 This assay was a duplex qPCR using the primers and conditions described by
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4 Hundesa et al. (2009), with the inclusion of an internal amplification control (IAC)
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6 and a carryover contamination prevention system utilising uracil N-glycosylase
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8 (UNG). The reaction contained 1 X TaqMan Universal PCR Master Mix (Applied
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10 Biosystems), 0.9 µM each primer, 0.225 µM porcine adenovirus TaqMan probe
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12 (labelled with FAM), 50 nM IAC probe (labelled with VIC), and 100 copies of
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14 porcine adenovirus IAC. Ten µl sample of nucleic acid extract was added, to make a
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16 final reaction volume of 25 µl. The thermocycling conditions were 10 min at 95°C,
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18 followed by 45 cycles of 15 s at 95°C and 1 min at 60°C.
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Bovine polyomavirus qPCR

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27 This assay was a duplex qPCR using the primers and conditions described by
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29 Hundesa et al. (2010), with the inclusion of an internal amplification control (IAC)
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31 and a carryover contamination prevention system utilising uracil N-glycosylase
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33 (UNG). The reaction contained 1 X TaqMan Universal PCR Master Mix (Applied
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35 Biosystems), 0.4 µM each primer, 0.120 µM bovine polyomavirus TaqMan probe
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37 (labelled with FAM), 50 nM IAC probe (labelled with VIC), and 300 copies of bovine
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39 polyomavirus IAC. Ten µl sample of nucleic acid extract was added, to make a final
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41 reaction volume of 25 µl. The thermocycling conditions were 10 min at 95°C,
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43 followed by 45 cycles of 15 s at 95°C and 1 min at 60°C.
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Quantitation

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54 Quantitation was performed using the most probable number approach. The nucleic
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56 acid extract was assayed neat, and in 10⁻¹ dilution, and two replicate assays were
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1 performed for each concentration. If both 10^{-1} replicates produced a positive signal,
2 subsequent dilutions were assayed until both replicates of a dilution were negative.
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6 7 **Results**

8 9 **Enterprise characterization**

10 11 *Enterprise type*

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13 The majority of the food businesses at point-of-sale throughout the supply chain were
14 more than 10 years old. In the primary sector the FBO owner was also the responsible
15 manager. The FBOs were members of a professional consortium/organisation
16 principally in enterprises at processing and point-of-sale. Casual labour was mainly
17 used in the primary production, mostly for manual harvesting.
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26 27 *Management procedures*

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29 Only a few enterprises worked under specific contract specifications. Good
30 Agricultural Practice (Global GAP) was only occasionally practiced at primary
31 production. A formal food safety system was mainly implemented at point-of-sale and
32 in some processing food businesses. In most cases these systems were accredited.
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34 Concurrently, internal and external auditing was in place. A formal quality system,
35 i.e. ISO 9001/2008, was implemented in some enterprises throughout the food supply
36 chain. Medical screening was in place throughout the food supply chain, particularly
37 at processing and point-of-sale.
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48 49 *Environment*

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51 At primary production domestic animals were regularly found to have access and/or
52 were present on the premises posing a risk to food safety. In most of the premises at
53 primary production no field sanitary accommodation was provided. However, staff
54 sanitary accommodation was reasonably accessible to field workers. At primary
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1 production raw manure was occasionally stored on-site and on one site it posed a
2 particular risk
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4 *Lay-out and design of premises*

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7 Throughout the supply chain structurally suitable designated staff sanitary
8 accommodation was provided, and most wash hand basins were provided with a
9
10 constant supply of hot and cold water. However, hand-free taps were provided only in
11
12 some premises at point-of-sale. In all premises the water supplied for hand washing in
13
14 the staff sanitary accommodation was of potable quality. In half of the premises soap
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16 without antimicrobials was used. Antimicrobial soap was mostly used at point-of-sale.
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18 At primary production unsuitable cloth towels were used for hand drying. At
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20 processing and point-of-sale paper towels were mostly used. Occasionally, hot air was
21
22 provided at point-of-sale. A designated cleaning area for cleaning equipment, utensils
23
24 and food crates was mostly provided in premises at point-of-sale, all of which had a
25
26 designated sink. In most cases, suitable sanitizers and disinfectants were used. At
27
28 primary production no designated field hand washing facilities were provided.
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30 Designated in-process hand washing facilities were provided in all premises at point-
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32 of-sale and in only one premises at processing. At point-of-sale half of the hand
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34 washing facilities included a constant supply of cold and hot water. Paper towels were
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36 provided in all of the in-process hand drying facilities and antimicrobial soap in the
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38 majority of them.
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48 *Distribution & transport*

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51 Most of the FBOs used their own transport vehicles, which were all structurally
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53 suitable and solely designated for transporting foodstuffs. However, refrigerated
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55 vehicles were only used at processing and point-of-sale. In these cases temperature
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57 was monitored using data loggers.
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Cleaning & sanitation

In most case the premises were regularly cleaned according to a documented cleaning plan, particularly the field/staff sanitary accommodation and the transport vehicles. Occasionally the cleaning plan did not include all areas. In contrast with cleaning, most areas were not properly sanitized, particularly utensils, equipment and transport vehicles at production and processing.

Pest control

Buildings were rarely structurally pest proofed. Particularly, openings such as external doors, windows and air intake points were not adequately screened. Proper pest control measures were only in place at processing and point-of-sale. However, most pest control plans included only rodents and flying insects. Control measures against crawling insects were only in place at point-of-sale.

Services

Throughout the supply chain shallow or deep untreated wells were used as primary water sources. Shallow wells were sampled with satisfactory results, but in primary production water was pumped to a shallow, untreated open water basin which was used as a reservoir. Public potable water was available throughout the supply chain and was in most cases compliant with EU drinking water regulations. Public potable water was the primary water source for all activities particularly, at point-of-sale.

Personal hygiene

At primary production no suitable protective clothing was worn by food workers, except for disposable gloves. At processing and point-of-sale a combination of hairnets or hats, suits or aprons and boots or shoes were worn. Evidence of good practice regarding the wearing of protective clothing and hand washing was found only at processing and point-of-sale.

Food workers training

Throughout the food supply chain training of food workers was mostly insufficient or at best limited to basic instructions. Essential documentation on hygiene and sanitation policies and/or practices was only provided at processing and point-of-sale, which in both phases also included a training schedule.

Monitoring

Throughout the supply chain the primary water source and the product was tested microbiologically and chemically in almost all premises. Only in one case the laboratory was not accredited. Batch samples of the product were retained for testing in almost all premises at processing and point-of-sale.

Labelling, traceability & recall

A labelling and traceability system was in place in most premises at processing and point-of-sale. At primary production particularly and at the farmers market labelling was not commonly in use and consequently a traceability system nor a recall procedure was implemented.

Detection of viruses

General sampling points

Summarized results per phase, matrix and virus type are presented in Table 1. HAdVs were detected in all three studied phases of primary production, processing and point of sale, at 18.61%, 2.89% and 26.4%, respectively. PAdVs were found only in samples from the primary production and point of sale phases at 15.4% and 4.2%, respectively, while bPyVs were detected only in samples from the primary production phase at 5.1%.

1 NoVs GI were detected at production and point of sale phases at 2.68% and 1.3%,
2 respectively, and similarly, NoVs GII were detected at 4.83% and 0.8%. HAV was
3 only detected in samples from the primary production phase at 2.6%. Finally, HEV
4 was found in 4.76% and 3.2% of samples from the primary production and point of
5 sale phases (no samples from the processing phase were analyzed for HEV).
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10 Manual harvesting was identified as a critical point for virus contamination and swab
11 samples collected from harvesters' hands were found positive for hAdV, NoV GII and
12 HAV at 16.3%, 1% and 2.1%, respectively. Swab samples collected from seasonal
13 workers' hands were found positive for hAdV at 3.3%. All samples collected from
14 food handlers' hands of the processing phase analyzed only for hAdVs were negative.
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24 Toilet swab samples from the production phase were found positive for hAdV, NoV
25 GI, NoV GII, and HAV at 20%, 22.2%, 12.5% and 11.1%, respectively. Similarly,
26 swab samples from toilet door-handles were found positive at 30.8%, 20%, 25%, and
27 10%. All surface swabs from various processing equipment tested for the indicator
28 viruses (hAdV, pAdV, bPyV) were negative. Irrigation water samples analysed for all
29 target viruses were positive for all index viruses (hAdV, pAdV, bPyV at 27.9%,
30 15.4%, 5.1%) and two pathogenic viruses (HEV, NoV GII at 5%, 4%). Rinsing water
31 samples from the processing phase analysed for hAdV, pAdV, bPyV, HAV, NoV GI,
32 were only found positive for hAdV at 18.2%. Manure samples analysed for hAdV,
33 HAV, NoV GII were found positive for hAdV and NoV GII at 60% and 100% (2/2),
34 respectively. Lettuce heads collected at the point of sale were positive for both index
35 (hAdV, pAdV at 26.4% and 4.2%, respectively) and pathogenic viruses (NoVGI,
36 NoVGII, HEV at 1.3%, 0.8% and 3.2%, respectively).
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56 **Ad hoc sampling points**

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1 HAdVs were detected in swabs: a) of three (3) empty plastic crates which are reused
2 by supermarkets, b) a food worker's knife used to cut lettuce heads from the fields, c)
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4 and from a toilet in lettuce processing and packaging facility. PAdV were detected in
5
6 two irrigation water samples originating from 15 meter deep wells directly on the
7
8 field. One sample of rinsing water, originating from the well on the field, was found
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10 positive for bPyV, while a swab from a toilet door-handle located at point of sale was
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12 found positive for NoV GI. In detail, hAdV, bPyV, pAdV, HAV, HEV, NoV GI, and
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14 NoV GII were detected at 9% (3/33), 4.54% (1/22), 9% (2/22), 0% (0/8), 0% (0/8),
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16 7.14% (1/14), 0% (0/11), respectively.
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22 **Quantitation**

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24 Estimated number of PCR detectable units for samples that contained human
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26 pathogenic viruses is presented in Table 2.
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34 **Discussion**

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36 The ability of contaminated food to serve as a vehicle of infection depends on virus
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38 stability, degree of initial contamination, the method of food processing and storage,
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40 viral dose needed to produce infection, and the susceptibility of the host. (Koopmans
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42 et al., 2002, Warriner 2009, D'Agostino 2011) Contamination of leafy greens produce
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44 can occur at multiple points, including at pre-harvest stage by contaminated water
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46 sources, contaminated amendments (e.g., raw manure or compost), or wildlife
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48 intrusion and at harvest or postharvest by cross-contamination potentially by any of
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50 the multiple people who handle the produce. (Gandhi et al. 2010, WHO/FAO 2008)
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52 With regards to the increasing incidence of food-borne viral infections, at time of
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54 writing the Codex Alimentarius Committee on Food Hygiene is preparing an
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1 international draft on a Code of Hygienic Practice for the control of viruses in foods.

2 (Ambrozic et al. 2011)

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4 We are actually moving towards a more holistic approach to food safety, where the
5 entire food chain needs to be considered in efforts to produce safer food. (WHO/FAO
6 2008) Such holistic approaches have been followed for bacterial agents, including
7 *Salmonella*, *E. coli* O157 and *Campylobacter*, but not for viruses. In the present study,
8 an integrated virological monitoring of leafy green vegetables chain has been
9 conducted in three European countries. Samples representing the production,
10 processing and point of sale phases of the chain, have been collected and analysed in
11 Greece, Serbia and Poland.
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24 Of the viral agents, HAV and NoVs are most commonly documented as
25 contaminating fruits and vegetables. In most instances, contamination of fresh
26 produce with enteric viruses is believed to occur before the product reaches food
27 service establishments. (Koopmans et al., 2002, Croci 2008, Dubois 2007) Usually
28 virus contamination occurs mainly on the surface of food crops, although a few
29 studies have reported on the potential for uptake and translocation of virus within
30 damaged plant tissue. (Seymour and Appleton, 2001) Virus adsorption to lettuce has
31 been found to vary depending on the strain and surface properties of the virus. (Vega
32 et al. 2008) Washing does not guarantee a substantial reduction in the viral
33 contamination. (Croci et al. 2002) The presence of viruses in biosolids may increase
34 the risk of lettuce contamination and viruses in open cuts and stomata may be
35 protected from sanitization. (Wei et al. 2011) Recombinant Norwalk virus-like
36 particles (rNVLP) have been recently shown to bind to the surfaces of romaine
37 lettuce, suggesting the potential availability of specific ligands on the leaf surface.
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58 (Gandhi 2010)
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1 As bacterial indicators generally fail to signal the potential for viral contamination,
2 bacteriophages, enteroviruses, and adenoviruses have all been proposed as alternative
3 indicators. (Lees et al. 2000, Muniain-Mujika et al., 2002) Adenoviruses have been
4 shown to be excreted by the populations of all geographical areas and to be the most
5 abundant viruses detected in urban sewage without significant seasonal variation and
6 for these reasons have been proposed as indicators of human fecal contamination in
7 water and food (Pina et al, 1998; Formiga-Cruz et al, 2002). Specific detection of
8 adenoviruses from human or animal origin should be a useful tool for tracing the
9 source of faecal viral contamination (Maluquer de Motes et al., 2004). The hAdV
10 qPCR assay of the present study has been designed to quantify all common human
11 adenoviruses. This assay in environmental studies and in shellfish samples (Formiga-
12 Cruz et al, 2002; Albinana-Gimenez N, 2009; Silvia Bofill-Mas, 2010) has proved to
13 be highly specific for hAdVs. The feasibility of using hAdVs as indicators of human
14 enteric viruses in environmental and shellfish samples was suggested by Pina et al.
15 (1998) who reported that these viruses were easily detected and seemed to be more
16 abundant and stable in environmental samples. HAV, HEV, and NoV GI and GII have
17 been selected as target pathogenic viruses for the present study. Vegetables food
18 supply chains were also monitored for the presence of index viruses commonly found
19 in faecal contamination events. To indicate the source of virus contamination (human
20 or animal) the presence of faecally derived adenoviruses and bovine polyomavirus
21 was monitored. The results of the present study provide validation of this approach for
22 the detection of faecal contamination of human and/or animal origin. HAdVs were
23 detected in all three studied phases of primary production, processing and point of
24 sale. PAdVs were found in samples from primary production and point of sale phases,
25 while bPyVs were detected in general samples from the primary production phase and
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1 an ad hoc sample of rinsing water (processing phase). Collectively, the results of the
2 indicator viruses show that: a) route of contamination exists from source to
3 monitoring point which pathogenic viruses could follow; b) the use of these index
4 viruses is a valuable MST (Molecular Source Tracking) tool, for tracing the source of
5 faecal viral contamination.
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11 Water has been identified as a critical control point in the farm to fork continuum.
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13 Spraying, washing or immersion of fruits and vegetables (produce) in water is a
14 common practice during post harvest processing. (Gandhi 2010) Water is also likely
15 to be an important source of contamination in the field. Possible sources are run-off
16 from nearby animal pastures and irrigation from a contaminated source. (Berger 2010)
17
18 The risk of disease transmission from pathogenic microorganisms present in irrigation
19 water is influenced by the level of contamination; the persistence of pathogens in
20 water, in soil, and on crops; and the route of exposure. (Steele and Odumeru, 2004)
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22 AdVs were the most frequently detected viruses in both groundwater and vegetable
23 samples that were cultivated using that groundwater. (Cheong et al, 2009) The role of
24 contaminated irrigation or washing water for viral contamination of vegetables has
25 been underlined by the results of the present study. Interestingly, irrigation water
26 samples analysed for all target viruses were positive for all index viruses (hAdV,
27 pAdV, bPyV), HEV and NoV GII. The irrigation water sample found positive for
28 HEV was a groundwater collected from the depth of 100 m, which makes well
29 contamination unlikely. On field investigation did not reveal the virus source for
30 water. The farmer never used animal manure as fertilizer, and there was not any pig
31 farm located in the neighbourhood of the lettuce plantation and even in its
32 surrounding. One of the most relevant and frequent risk factors involved in
33 contamination with acute hepatitis E was found to be the direct or indirect
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1 consumption of water from a private well or a nearby river. (Renou et al. 2008)

2 Rinsing water samples from the processing phase were positive for hAdV and bPyV

3 (rinsing water-ad hoc sample). These results indicate the water virus contamination by

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7 human and animal sources.

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9 Contaminated raw manure or compost may be responsible for viral contamination of

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11 vegetables. The attachment of murine norovirus 1 (MNV) in biosolids, swine manure,

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13 and dairy manure to Romaine lettuce and internalization of this virus were evaluated

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15 in a recent study of Wei and colleagues, which showed that presence of MNV in

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17 biosolids may increase the risk of fresh produce contamination. (Wei et al. 2010)

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19 Interestingly, bovine manure samples of the present study were found positive for

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21 hAdV and NoV GII at 60% (3/5) and 100% (2/2), respectively, indicating human

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23 faecal contamination. Manure was stored on the field. The possibility of faecal

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29 contamination by workers was not excluded.

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31 Because food-borne viruses are transmitted via the faecal-oral route through contact

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33 with human faeces and because infected individuals can shed millions of virus

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35 particles in their stools, the role of infected food-handlers cannot be underestimated.

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37 (Koopmans et al., 2002) Indeed, any food that has been handled manually and is not

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39 further heated prior to consumption has the potential to be virally contaminated.

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41 (Richards, 2001) Touching pieces of fresh lettuce with artificially contaminated

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43 finger-pads for 10 s resulted in transfer of approximately 9.2% of infectious HAV.

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45 (Bidawid et al. 2000) Norovirus and hepatitis A outbreaks are commonly caused by

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47 the contamination of foodstuffs from the hands of infected workers (Berger 2010,

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49 Heaton 2008, WHO/FAO 2008) Swab samples collected from harvesters' hands were

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51 positive for hAdV, NoV GII and HAV, in our study, while swab samples from

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59 seasonal harvesters' hands were positive for hAdV, underlining the role of manual

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1 handling on viral contamination. All samples collected from food handlers' hands of
2 the processing phase analyzed only for hAdVs were negative, indicating higher levels
3 of hygiene at the processing facilities, which has been confirmed by the food safety
4 fact-finding missions. Toilet and toilet door-handle samples from the production
5 phase were positive for hAdV, NoV GI, NoV GII, and HAV. Two additional positive
6 samples for hAdV and NoV GI were detected from the analysis of ad hoc swab
7 samples of a toilet in lettuce processing and packaging facility, and a toilet door-
8 handle located at point of sale, respectively. On the contrary, all surface swabs from
9 processing equipment (knives -manual or mechanical-, conveyor belt) tested for the
10 index viruses (hAdV, pAdV, bPyV) were negative. Interestingly, hAdV were detected
11 in two ad hoc swab samples of a worker's knife used to cut lettuce heads from the
12 fields and three (3) empty plastic crates which are reused by from supermarkets.

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29 Lettuce heads collected at the point of sale were positive for both index (hAdV,
30 pAdV) and pathogenic viruses (NoVGI, NoVGII, HEV). In combination with virus
31 prevalence data from earlier phases of the leafy vegetables chain, this finding supports
32 the existence of routes of contamination of the final product and the potential public
33 health risks, by the consumption of lettuce.

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41 To improve microbiological detection and monitoring and to increase insights into the
42 contribution of fruits and vegetables to foodborne viral transmission, sensitive,
43 reliable, and standardized methods are needed. (Croci et al, 2008, Fino and Kniel
44 2008) In the present study, advanced methods for virus detection throughout the leafy
45 vegetables supply chains, from farm to market, have been applied. The most effective
46 assays for detection of foodborne viruses are those based on amplification of viral
47 nucleic acids (Croci et al. 2008; Bosch et al. 2011, D'Agostino 2011), therefore
48 VITAL has applied well confirmed RT-qPCR protocols for virus detection in food
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1 and environmental samples. The methods were based on the Standard Operating
2 Procedures (SOPs) developed by VITAL project which will be made available by the
3 authors on request.
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7 In many instances, control of viral contamination in food needs to focus on prevention
8 of contamination (e.g. preventive measures at source, sewage treatment or in food
9 handling), rather than destruction of the pathogen through the use of various
10 inactivation processes. In fact, once fresh produce is contaminated by viruses, there
11 are no realistic post-harvest risk control measures except cooking which is not an
12 option with ready-to-eat fresh produce. (WHOFAOMRA, Newell 2010 Lynch et al.
13 2009) It is essential for thorough food safety management, that systems are developed
14 whereby viruses can be monitored at critical points throughout food supply chains.
15
16 The application of a method for detection of human adenoviruses in food samples
17 could be useful for routine monitoring for food safety management, to determine if a
18 route of contamination exists from human source to food supply chain which
19 pathogenic viruses such as NoV and HAV could follow. (D'Agostino 2011) A better
20 understanding of plant, microbiological, environmental, farm, processing and food
21 handling factors, that interact with one another to determine whether contamination
22 occurs, and whether pathogens survive will support the development of evidence-
23 based policies, procedures, and technologies aimed at improving the safety of fresh
24 produce. (Berger 2010)
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29 The numbers of samples tested for viral contamination were relatively small in this
30 study, especially considering the expected low prevalence. Therefore the results
31 presented should be interpreted as indicative, and for greater confidence in the results,
32 a greater number of samples would have to be tested. (Berto 2011) Furthermore, the
33 monitoring as applied in the current study is more likely to detect structural
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1 contamination events rather than episodic contamination events. Therefore, sampling
2 points that tested negative throughout the monitoring might be important for episodic
3 viral contamination nevertheless. Information and knowledge gained from this survey
4 should be used to direct and support future food safety research and food safety
5 programs to manage potential risks from viral contamination of food products.
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12 (Arthur 2007)
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16 **Conclusions**

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18 The current study which was part of the VITAL project, verified the existence of leafy
19 vegetables virus contamination routes, demonstrated the usefulness of index viruses,
20 as a tool for tracing the source of faecal viral contamination, and finally underlined
21 the need for future similar studies for the integrated management of foodborne viral
22 diseases in Europe and worldwide.
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40 assistance, and to all VITAL members.
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Table 1. Summarized results of the data gathered from the “general” sampling points of the leafy vegetable supply chains per phase, matrix and virus type.

Point of interest	hAdV	pAdV	bPyV Production	HAV	HEV	NoV GI	NoV GII
Irrigation water	17/61 (27.9%)	6/39 (15.4%)	2/39 (5.1%)	0/35	1/20 (5.0%)	1/35	1/25 (4.0%)
Toilets/latrines	3/15 (20.0%)	n.d.	n.d.	1/9 (11.1%)	n.d.	2/9 (22.2%)	1/8 (12.5%)
Toilet door handles	4/13 (30.8%)	n.d.	n.d.	1/10 (10.0%)	0/1	2/10 (20.0%)	2/8 (25.0%)
Harvesters hands	34/209 (16.3%)	n.d.	n.d.	2/97 (2.1%)	n.d.	0/94	1/101 (1.0%)
Seasonal workers hands	1/30 (3.3%)	n.d.	n.d.	0/1	n.d.	0/1	0/1
Manure	3/5 (60%)	n.d.	n.d.	0/2	n.d.	n.d.	2/2
Processing							
Food handlers' hands	0/33	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Conveyor belt	0/1	0/1	0/1	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Rinsing water	2/11 (18.2%)	0/5	0/5	0/1	n.d.	0/1	n.d.
Knives, manual	0/16	0/16	0/16	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Knives mechanical	0/8	0/8	0/8	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Point of Sale							
Fresh lettuce	70/265 (26.4%)	7/166 (4.2%)	0/176	0/149	4/125 (3.2%)	2/149 (1.3%)	1/126 (0.8%)

number of positives/number tested; n.d.: no data

Table 2. Estimated number of PCR detectable units for samples that contained human pathogenic viruses.

Sample type	Virus	Estimated PDU	
		Mean	95% CI
Hands <i>(n per hand)</i>	NoV G2	84	20 – 234
	HAV	24	1 – 112
	HAV	19	1 – 82
Irrigation water <i>(n per L)</i>	NoV G2	16	2 – 86
	HEV	2	0.3 – 5
Lettuce heads <i>(n per 25 g)</i>	HEV (estimated for 3 samples)	6	0.3 – 28
	HEV	23	3 – 129
	NoV G1	5	0.3 – 20
	NoV G1	6	0.3 – 28
	NoV G2	10	2 – 29
Toilet swabs <i>(n per swab)</i>	NoV G1 & NoV G2	280	41 – 1308
	NoV G1 & HAV	96	13 – 518
Doorhandle swabs <i>(n per swab)</i>	NoV G1	84	20 – 234
	NoV G1 & NoV G2	96	13 – 518
	NoV G2	19	1 – 82
	HAV	280	41 – 1308